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THE ROLE OF LAW IN MEDICAL PROGRESS
E. BLYTHE STASON*
Medical science expands at an ever accelerating rate. Kidney transplants are
now almost commonplace; over iooo of them have been performed in the last dozen
years. Liver and heart transplants are making current headlines; the lung may be
next. Radioisotopes are used for both diagnosis and therapy. The mechanism of
human heredity is increasingly an open book. Cardiac catheterization is everyday
business, and management of malignancy is constantly on the upgrade. Medical
research has opened these and other new vistas, and better things are doubtless just
around the corner. Modern medicine is indeed frontier business.
At the same time legal science-or should it be called an "art'?-is also con-
stantly encountering new frontiers created by the continuing scientific and tech-
nological revolution. Nuclear substances are giving rise to new legal problems.
Supersonic transports will soon carry us from New York to Tel Aviv in three
hours, and their sonic booms are certain to have impact on the law. Electronic
devices are leaving us with diminishing privacy and ultimately may penetrate the
inmost thoughts of man. Modern medicine gives birth to new legal problems. The
law and lawyers will be forced to play a significant role as the new order continues
to unfold.
In this article we propose to examine one of these frontiers-medicine and law-
to attempt an evaluation of the possibilities of law-medicine cooperation in finding
helpful solutions for the future. Such interprofessional cooperation, while seemingly
an obvious prerequisite of progress, cannot be taken for granted, for much dis-
harmony and mutual mistrust exists between the professions. Medical malpractice
suits in courts of law, the agonies of the expert medical witness on the stand, the
federal restrictions on the use of investigational drugs, and various other encounters
with the law have created in the minds of many doctors an image of law and
lawyers that is far from complimentary. On the other hand, members of the legal
profession are well aware of some of the medical profession's less appealing aspects-
for example, some doctors' violent antipathy to "Medicare" and the problem some-
times characterized as the "conspiracy of silence" which makes it so difficult to get
professional expert testimony in a malpractice suit against a defendant doctor.
As a consequence of these and other abrasive contacts between the two professions,
and notwithstanding the many thousands of fine personal friendships and much
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mutual admiration, there is found in each profession an unfortunately high degree
of disrespect for the other calling, which seriously handicaps the necessary processes
whereby the law impinges on medical practice.
In the course of a recent lecture, Dr. Charles G. Child III, Professor of Surgery
and Chairman of the Department of Surgery in the Medical School of the University
of Michigan, approached this problem of professional dichotomy with candor and
perspicacity.2 After psychoanalyzing the two professions and identifying their differ-
ences, Dr. Child pointed out basic disparities in the personality and education of
members of the two professions. Then he observed:
In my opinion, the adversary method of administering justice may very well be
the single most important deterrent to cooperation between law and medicine in
the conduct of malpractice actions. This procedure is so ill-suited to any reasonable
medical ends that its use engenders not only hostility but also reflects as well a
conscious withdrawal amongst the medical profession. Few indeed have been
the important issues in medicine that have been resolved by controversy and dis-
pute.3
Dr. Child further contrasted medicine, with its scientific method and objective
inquiry into facts, and the law, with its Socratic method which etches clearly things
supposed to be derived from the past by rational beings. The thought processes of the
two professions, he said, are so different that they do not readily merge in attack
upon specific problems. Finally, Dr. Child noted that the slow pace and the delays
in legal proceedings keep the doctor, whether a party or a witness, away from his
patients and that even life itself may be adversely affected. In short, Dr. Child offers
much food for thought for one seeking to explore "the role of law in medical
progress," as we are doing in this article.
Notwithstanding the difficulties that Dr. Child suggests, we now proceed to look
more closely at the various facets of the law-medicine relationship. Law and medi-
cine meet in many areas. The role of law will, we safely predict, be one of in-
creasing significance in the future of medicine.
I
POSSIBLE AREAS OF CONTACT BETWEEN LAW AND MEDICINE
OF mE FuTuRE
To approach our task of considering the role of law in the medical future we
will help orient ourselves by first surveying the larger scene. This will give an
IThe American: Medical Association has taken a constructive interest in medical professional liability.
Since 1954 the Law Department of the Association has made a continuing study of the subject. In 1957
a series of twenty-one articles was published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, dealing
with nearly all aspects of the matter. A bi-weekly publication, The Citation, is currently issued by the
Law Department. Now in its fourteenth volume, this publication acquaints the medical profession with
the many pitfalls of the law.
2 Child, Lawyers, Doctors and Medical Malpractice: A Surgeon Reacts, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 43
(Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1965).
'1d. at 47.
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impression of the wide dimensions of the matter before we get down to the task
of more careful examination of the role of law in dealing with a few subjects we
have chosen for closer inspection.
Areas of interaction between law and medicine in the future will include at least
the areas delineated in the fourteen ensuing paragraphs:
(i) Psychiatry and the law. The understanding of psychiatrists concerning
mental illness and its treatment do not mesh satisfactorily with the rather more
primitive precepts of the criminal law. The debate goes on not only over the
various possible definitions of criminal responsibility, but also over the procedures
whereby mental incompetents are committed for treatment and the sufficiency
of the treatment given such persons to justify deprivation of their liberty in the
absence of due process of law. The future holds the potential for unlimited develop-
ment in this field as psychiatric techniques improve, as more funds are channeled
into this needy area, and as law adapts its rather clumsy institutions to the subtle
problems of coping with mental illness in an increasingly anxiety-inducing society.
(2) Alcoholism. Alcoholism has been called the nation's fourth most serious
health problem, affecting some 6,oooooo persons, many of whom are potentially
highly productive but are handicapped by compulsive drinking. Courts are begin-
ning to hold that chronic alcoholism is not a crime but a disease.4 Doctors must
participate in working out changes in the laws and in setting up centers for the
treatment of alcoholism.5
(3) Narcotics offenders. A "pusher" is a criminal; a user of narcotics may not
be a criminal but a person needing medical aid whom the medical profession should
be free to treat.' The law and medicine must cooperate to provide the opportunity
and the means for effective treatment.7
(4) Population control. This is a controversial matter. The Supreme Court has
provided protection from legislative intrusion for families wishing to practice birth
control.' The more difficult and pressing problem is how the population explosion
is to be kept within bounds. Family planning and birth control advice and equip-
ment are a small step, it would seem, though religious pressures still inhibit full
efforts in these areas. Economic disincentives to reproduce may be utilized in the
future as well.
I Compare Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4 th Cir. 1966) and Easter v. District of Columbia, 361
F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) with Application of Spinks, 6z Cal. Rptr. 745 (Ct. App. 1967).
See generally Kupferman, Treatment of Alcoholism Must Change With Times, TIuAL, Aug.-Sept.
1966, at 49-50.
0 A statute punishing the "status" of drug addiction is cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o (1962). California
courts have found involuntary commitment imposed on the addict for purposes of treatment, as opposed
to punishment, to not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In re Trummer, 6o Cal. 2d 658, 38x
P.2d 177, 36 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1964).
7 See generally W. ELDRIDGE, NAtconscs AND THE LAw i8-25 (1962).
'Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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(5) Genetics. A gradual movement toward premarital genetic testing and
counselling may be expected as a means of minimizing birth defects and other
hereditary maladies. Presumably the day is much farther off when law will attempt
in any direct way to control the eugenic development of the population.
(6) Artificial insemination. Changes in the law will be necessary to assure
legitimacy of births resulting from such procedures. Also, damage suit possibilities
are present in the absence of informed consent, as well as in instances of breach of
secrecy. Finally there are innumerable questions raised concerning relations in
the family, such as grounds for divorce, child support, and inheritance rights.0
(7) "Medicare." This was one of the most controversial pieces of legislation
of the decade because of the alleged trend toward "socialized" medicine, but seem-
ingly the bureaucratic machinery is in fair working order today and is increasingly
approved by laymen and by doctors. The influence of this law on the practice of
medicine and quality of medical care is as yet incalculable. The guidance of the
new administrative influences in the right directions is one of the paramount
challenges in medical-legal affairs today.
(8) "Medicaid." This is the important extension of Medicare to low-income
families under Tide XIX of the Social Security Amendments of 1965.10 It has
disturbed many doctors and the budget makers in many states, but it is likely to
be with us for a long time and to influence greatiy the over-all quality of medical
care provided in this country, where, incidentally, high infant mortality among the
poor is a national disgrace.
(9) "Good Samaritan" laws. These are widely sought by the medical pro-
fession and are already on the books in thirty-two states. They limit malpractice
actions against physicians who offer to help injured persons under emergency condi-
ditions, especially on the highways. Carefully collected statistics indicate that seldom
does a good Samaritan action succeed and that there is not too much for doctors
to fear."1 But apprehension persists, and legal protection may be justified to prevent
needed assistance from being withheld. The argument for legislation might be
even stronger if the law were construed to create an affirmative duty to render such
assistance.
(io) Computers. It may happen a decade hence, but someday diagnosis and
treatment that does not include retrieval of relevant data from the memory of a
computer will be deemed to fall short of the familiar standard, the practice of
reputable physicians in -the community.' Other uses of computers will likewise
speed medical progress and improve the quality of medical care.
' See generally Verkauf, Artificial Insemination: Progress. Polemics, and Confusion-An Appraisal
of Current Medico-Legal Status, 3 HousroN L. REv. 277 (x966).
"0 §§ 121-22, 79 Stat. 343 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
"
1 Plant, "Good Samaritan" Laws in Legal Dilemma, TrAuL, Oct.-Nov. 1966, at 34.
"
5 See generally McGraw & McGraw, Automating Medicine, SATuDAY Rnviaw, Oct. 7, 1967, at 66-69.
See also Freed, Legal Aspects of Computer Use in Medicine, in this symposium, p. 674.
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(ix) Homotransplantation. The process of removing a part from one human
body and implanting it in another is among the most dramatic of medical feats.
Blood, skin, bone, and kidneys have been transferred from one living person to
another, and corneas, kidneys, the liver, and, most dramatically, the heart have been
salvaged from the dead. The legal questions are many.
(12) Abortion. Most abortion laws date from the nineteenth century. They
contain prohibitions that conflict with the twentieth century's demands and with the
judgment of most members of the medical profession.
(13) Patient consent to therapy. Informed consent is a new facet of malpractice
and assault and battery now emerging in legal actions to add to the medical
profession's exasperation with the law.
(14) Subject consent to human experimentation. The vast increase of medical
research is assuredly for the benefit of mankind, but the necessarily increasing use of
human research subjects is creating special problems with respect to which improved
cooperation and understanding between law and medicine are clearly needed.
In the remainder of this article we shall direct more detailed attention to only
the last four of the topics named, namely homotransplantation, abortion, patient
consent to therapy, and subject consent to experimentation. From these we will try
to draw some conclusions concerning the role of law in medical progress.
II
TRANSPLANTATION OF HUMAN TissuEs' 3
A. Technical Aspects
What will be the role of law in homotransplantations? Human bodies and
human tissues are used in many aspects of medical science, and the use increases
year by year, especially as knowledge advances with respect to immunology and
rejection of foreign tissues. Human bodies and parts thereof are used in teaching,
research, and transplantation. Whole bodies or their parts are dissected in teaching
and research laboratories. Transplantation of parts under existing surgical pro-
cedures frequently involves skin, bone, blood, corneas, arteries, kidneys, and in recent
months even the human heart. The pituitary glands are removed to recover hor-
mones for medical uses. Even the liver has been transplanted, and in the future the
lung and other vital parts may be subject to transfer from one body to another.
Both living and nonliving donors are used.
These procedures are becoming increasingly numerous and important as medical
science progresses from year to year. It is reported, for example, that there have
been over 0ooo kidney transplants performed in the world in the last thirteen years,
with seventy-five per cent of them in the last five years. Transplants from living
" For a wider ranging treatment of legal and medical issues involved in organ transplants, see Stickel,
Organ Transplantation in Medical and Legal Perspectives, in this symposium, p. 597-
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relatives have been sixty-five to seventy per cent successful. Cadaver transplants
have been about forty per cent successful.' 4 Unfortunately there is a shortage of
available kidneys. It is said that renal transplants may, in due course, if sufficient
supply becomes available, save from 6,ooo to io,ooo lives per year in the United
States alone.
The potential supply of transplantable parts would actually exceed the demand
if full utilization could be made of nonliving donors, but there are problems to be
solved. There is the matter of logistics, which is indeed formidable. With a living
donor in the next room, there is no great problem, but with a nonliving donor, time
is of the essence. For a few minutes after death cellular metabolism continues
throughout the majority of the body cell mass. Certain tissues are suitable for
removal only during this brief interval, although improvements in storage and
preservation may permit a short delay in actual implantation in the recipient.
Cadaver tissues are divided into two groups according to the speed with which
they must be salvaged. First, there are "critical" tissues, such as the kidney and
liver, which must be removed from the deceased within a matter of thirty to forty-
five minutes after death. 5 On the other hand, certain "noncritical" tissues may be
removed more at leisure. Skin may be removed within twelve hours from time
of death. The cornea may be taken at any time within six hours. The fact is,
however, that in all cases action must be taken promptly to make use in a living
recipient of the parts of a nonliving donor, and this gives rise to legal problems.
There is but little time to negotiate with surviving relatives, and waiting for the
probate of the will is out of the question.
B. Legal Aspects
As previously noted, transplantation may take place either from one living
person to another living person or from a dead person to the living. In the former
case, all that is required is the appropriate written and witnessed "informed con-
sent," which will be discussed later in this article, authorizing the surgical removal
from the donor and -the implantation in the recipient. If utilization of all or any
part of the body after death is intended, the matter becomes more complicated both
in fact and in law.
The complications arise from the variety of interests in the dead body. The
deceased naturally had an interest in his body during -his lifetime, and any expression
of his wishes as to its post-mortem disposition may or may not be effective, depending
upon the local law. After death, the surviving spouse or, if none, the surviving
1 Murray, Barnes & Atkinson, Fifth Report of the Human Kidney Transplant Registry, 5 TANSPLANTA-
-5ON 752, 774 (5967)-
1 After removal, the tissues can be preserved for six hours or so when stored at 5°C., and for even
longer periods if continuously perfused with a proper blood and salt solution. This and other technical
aspects of transplantation are discussed in Couch, Curran & Moore, The Use of Cadaver Tissues in Trans-
plantation, 271 NEw ENG. J. MsD. 691 (1964).
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child or parent or other relative has an interest that must be recognized and dealt
with. Primarily this is an emotional interest connected with the dignity of the
disposition of the body. Finally, the public has an interest, as, for example, in
finding the cause of death by autopsy when suspicious circumstances are involved.'6
Also, the public interest includes having available a sufficient number of bodies
and parts of bodies to satisfy the needs of teaching, research, and therapy.'
These various interests in the body, some of which conflict with others to a
greater or lesser extent, give rise to a number of troublesome points of law. The
first revolves around the possession of rights in the dead body. Who possess such
rights and what are they? Common law principles, originated in the seventeenth
century in the English ecclesiastical courts, announced the concept that there are
no "property rights" in the ordinary sense in the dead human body. This principle
was carried into the common law courts in the latter part of the seventeenth
century.' s In general, the private rights, such as they are, that exist respecting a dead
body involve the assurance of a dignified treatment of the body and a decent burial.
The rights belong first to the surviving spouse, then to the children, and finally
to the next of kin, in that order, unless the statutes specifically provide otherwise. 9
Moreover, the person who has the right to possession is entitled to receive the body
in the same condition as when death occurred, unless this right is modified in some
manner as provided by law. He can recover damages from anyone who performs
an unauthorized autopsy on the body, or who mutilates it, or dissects it, or removes
or keeps parts without his consent2 0 In view of the foregoing it is clear that any
interest possessed by the survivors must be reckoned with. Before the surgeon
undertakes a transplant, he must, unless the deceased has made a valid ante-mortem
gift, negotiate with them to obtain consent. Moreover, time for so doing is limited.
A second legal question of significance in connection with human transplants is
whether or not a person during his lifetime can make a legally effective gift of his
body or a portion thereof to be carried out after his death, either by giving it to a
named donee or to a specified hospital or to any person in need. Will such gift be
"e Statutes in all states provide for autopsies by the coroner or medical examiner, who is given authority
to proceed even against the wishes of the relatives.
' This interest of the public has been manifested by the adoption of statutes in about 8o% of the
states providing for the delivery of unclaimed bodies to medical schools for dissection in the teaching of
anatomy and physiology and for medical research. There is always an inadequate supply of such bodies,
especially at the present time with the generous burial provisions available through public bounty. In
any event, since these bodies are usually embalmed and are normally released long after death, they are
of no value for organ transplantation purposes.
"s See generally Vestal, Taber & Shoemaker, Medico-Legal Aspects of Tissue Homotransplantation,
8 U. DaT. L.J. 271, 273 (954). The authors have set forth an extensively documented statement of
the legal background.
"
5 Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 310, 50 N.V. 238, 239 (1891).
20 The monetary damages may not be great. $3,000-5,000 seems to be about enough to assuage
the usual plaintiff's grief, although some verdicts are larger. See Patrick v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 233 Mo. App. 251, 118 S.V.2d 1i6 (1938); Phillips v. Newport, 28 Tenn. App. x87, 187 S.W.2d
965 (1945). The principal damage often takes the form of injury to the public repute of the defendant
surgeon. This can be serious.
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
a nullity if survivors object, or will it take precedence over the wishes and burial
rights of the survivors? According to the common law any such attempted ante-
mortem gift could be repudiated by the next of kin, and this is still the law in at
least a dozen states 21 In certain other states there is at least uncertainty with
respect to the application of the common law. Therefore it is clear that if trans-
plants are to be facilitated on any reasonably satisfactory and universal basis, there
must be specific statutory authorization of such ante-mortem donations, which must
prevail over contrary desires of survivors. The doubt must be eliminated, and those
who act in good faith in reliance upon an antemortem authorization must be
protected.
Because of the desirability of removing all doubt with regard to the effectiveness
of ante-mortem consents, upwards of thirty states have in recent years, especially
since about i95o, adopted statutes dealing with the subject in some manner, the
majority of these laws being to some extent inadequate; several states have adopted
statutes authorizing donation of corneas or eyes alone 2  Because of this lack of
uniformity in the statutes, there is a choice of law problem which may arise when
the domiciliary of one state dies in another state, having made a gift of his organs
in one or the other or even in a third state prior to his death.2 Few of the statutes
cover the details of execution, delivery, and possible revocation of agreements of
gift, and some of them fail to include specific exculpatory provisions protecting
surgeons, hospitals, and others from embarrassing complications if some of the
survivors are dissatisfied 4
"1 Couch, Curran & Moore, supra note 15, at 693.
22 The Law Revision Commission of New York has recently presented a report to the New York
State Legislature recommending a comprehensive statute to replace the present statute which authorizes
only gifts of eyes. The report includes an analysis of the laws of all the states. See N.Y. LEGis. Doc.
(x964) No. 65 D.
" If the donor dies outside his state of domicile, a conflict in the choice of state law may arise when
the law of the state of death is contrary to the law of the donor's domicile. One example would be where
the law of the state of death authorized the donation, and the law of the state of domicile did not. Prac-
tically speaking, the question would be whether the next of kin could sue the doctor removing the
donated organ: contrary to their wishes, and thus effectively prevent the removal in the state of death.
Traditional application of the law of conflicts on testamentary disposition might result in application
of the law of the domiciliary state. If, however, the interests served by the respective statutes in this
problem are analyzed, the law of the state of death should prevail. Recipients benefited by such donations
will reside in that state, and by enacting an authorization statute, the legislature has expressed a concern
for their benefit and a desire to encourage progress in medical science. The state of domicile, on the
other hand, is concerned with the interests of next of kin and wants to prevent the practice of organ
removal by the medical profession through the prospect of a civil action being filed by the next of
kin against the physician.
As a practical factor, physicians should not be responsible for compliance with the law of innumerable
jurisdictions and for the resolution of conflicts with the law of their own state. A standard which con-
sistently applies the law of the state in which death occurs will enable the doctor to act with the
necessary promptness, provided, of course, that the state has enacted the requisite authorization statute.
" Gift of human tissue statutes are found on the books of the following states: Alabama, Alaska
(eyes only), Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine (eyes only), Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey (eyes only),
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From the foregoing discussion it becomes apparent that the proper shape of a
state statute authorizing and effectuating ante-mortem gifts of human tissue should,
among other things, make provision for the following:
I. Who may execute a valid ante-mortem gift of his own body or a portion
thereof? Many statutes provide that anyone "competent to make a will" may
do so.
2. Who among the survivors may make a gift, either post-mortem or just
prior to death? The statute should set up the authorized order of priority among
survivors.
3. To whom may human tissues be donated? Black-market tissue banks are
not to be desired, and therefore potential donees must be carefully identified.
4. What is to be the manner of execution of gifts? Is it to be by will or by
some other document? And what are to be the formalities of execution? Pro-
vision should be made for a simple form of document, with preference for a small
card to be carried on the donor's person evidencing the gift.
5. Gifts should be permitted either to a specific donee or to a specific hospital
or, in general terms, to anyone in need for an authorized purpose.
6. Since time is of the essence, probate should be expressly eliminated. If a
specific donee is named and is not reasonably available, the attending physician
at death or immediately thereafter should be authorized to act in reliance upon
the card evidencing the gift. He should act as the agent of the donee with all
of the powers of the donee to use the gift for any authorized purpose as he
deems best.
7. Revocation of the gift should be permitted in case the donor changes his
mind at the last minute.
8. Liability for damages should be negatived in every case of good faith
reliance upon a gift without notice of revocation.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is currently
engaged in drafting a Uniform Anatomical Gift Act that will meet the foregoing
specifications. It will, when approved in final form, probably during 1968, be promul-
gated as a uniform act and recommended for adoption by all of the states. The act
is currently being drafted with the cooperation and assistance of many doctors and
their organizations as well as the lawyer members of the National Conference. The
cooperative review by both professions should assure a satisfactory solution.
The uniform act should meet with ready acceptance by state legislatures, and,
when adopted, it will certainly clarify many of the doubtful legal aspects with
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia (eyes only), and
Wisconsin. For purposes of comparison the followinrg are interesting: Ontario, Stats. 1962-63, ch. 59;
Italy, Presidential Decree of June 26, x967, [1967] Gaz. Uff. 3478; France, Decree No. 472057 of
Oct. 20, 1947; and Regulations of United Kingdom, Human Tissues Act ig6i.
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respect to transplantation. It will facilitate taking advantage of modern medical
and surgical developments for the benefit of those in need of corneas, kidneys, or
other spare parts. Finally, the act will illustrate one aspect of the role of law
in medical progress: an influential national legal organization will have undertaken




A. State Statutes Dealing with Abortion26
Abortion is another area of medical concern where the law plays an important
role. Most state abortion laws are highly restrictive. They were enacted in the
nineteenth century and have been largely unchanged even in those states that have
recently enacted new oriminal codes. Although the statutory language differs
slightly from state to state, the practical effect in most states is that abortion is
a felony except when necessary to save the life of the mother. There are many
detailed variations in the laws. For example, some states permit only a physician
or surgeon to terminate a pregnancy; others permit anyone to do it if under legally
justified circumstances. Many statutes purport to require that the abortion be
absolutely necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman, while others, such as
New York's, 27 are satisfied if the surgeon has a reasonable belief that such a
necessity exists; other states, including Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania,28
simply prohibit performing an abortion in broad terms qualified by language like
"unlawfully" or "without lawful justification." Some states require consultation
with one or more other physicians before operating. The statutes of Alabama,
Maryland, New Mexico, and the District of Columbia29 legalize abortions if neces-
sary to protect the health, as well as to save the life, of the mother. In short, the
statutes in the several states purport to set up an almost nationwide barrier to
abortion. However, as in other areas, the law encounters the frailties of human
nature, and the intentions of the framers of the statutes are not fulfilled.
"
5 The first draft of the proposed Uniform Anatomical Gift Act was given a careful review at the
1967 Annual Meeting of the National Conference held in Honolulu, July 3o-August 5. After revision,
the measure will be reconsidered and possibly adopted at the 1968 Annual Meeting to be held in Phila-
delphia in August 1968. The Chairman of the National Conference committee who is the principal drafts-
man of the uniform act is the author of this article.
"
6 See generally George, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements for Re/orm, 17 W. REs.
L. REv. 371 (1965). In this article Professor George analyzes all of the state statutes in detail and with
extensive citations.
"'N.Y. RavisEa PENAL LAw §§ 125.05, .40, .45 (McKinney Supp. x965).
"
5 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (956); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (9,53); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4718 (1963).
'AiALA CoDE tit. 14, § 9 (i958); Mli. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (i957); N.M. STAT. ANN . §§ 4oA-5-r,
-3 (1953); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 22.201 (x967).
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Notwithstanding the generally uncompromising prohibitions of the law, there
are estimated to be up to i,ooo,ooo abortions performed each year in this country,3"
most of them being illegal and carried out under hazardous conditions. There are,
of course, no available sources for accurate statistical count. Some say that the total
falls substantially short of the number stated though it is obvious that the activity
is widespread. It is also frequently claimed that as many as ioooo deaths occur
each year from illegal abortions, although again some say that this figure is prob-
ably far too high and that the actual number may be as low as 50o. Again accurate
statistical information is not available.
It is known, however, that about Io,ooo abortions are performed each year in
ostensible accordance with the law. These abortions are carried out in hospitals with
proper surgical supervision and for more or less proper medical reasons. There is
no record of a criminal conviction as a result of an abortion carried out under these
conditions even though there are reasons to believe that physicians have not strictly
observed the statutory tests of legality.3 '
Professor B. James George, Jr., a codraftsman of the proposed revised criminal
code in Michigan, has conducted a comprehensive survey of all of the state statutes
on the subjectY - He takes note of the fact that the present statutory restrictions
force many women to turn to unqualified operators with all of the hazards inherent
in their procedures. He comments on the over-all effect of the present laws in the
following manner:
To continue the present restrictive laws on abortion is to purchase the illusion
of security at considerable human loss. Enforcement of criminal statutes in their
present form may accomplish about all the protection possible against untrained
abortionists, but with corresponding disadvantages which perhaps more than offset
the gains. These disadvantages are the harassment of the medical profession by
zealous prosecutors, and the creation of intolerable tension in the doctor who is torn
between his desire to perform an abortion, which he believes to be necessary on
humanitarian grounds, and his fear of performing it because it is illegal.P3
The doctor's dilemma noted here is the central factor in the tentative reforms that
have been accomplished in recent months.
" Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 285
(1966). But cf. Rewriting the Law on Abortion, MEDICAL WvVoRLD Naws, Sept. 29, X967, at 46, 52.
"See generally Sands, supra note 3o; The Law of Therapeutic Abortion: A Social Commentary on
Proposed Reform, 15 J. Pum. L. 386, 393-95 (1966). For a critical discussion of therapeutic abortions
performed for "psychiatric reasons," see White, Induced Abortions: A Survey of Their Psychiatric Impli-
cations, Complications, and Indications, 24 Tax. REPoRTs OF BIOLOGY AND MEDIcINE 531 (1966). The
California Board of Medical Examiners reprimanded one physician and placed a second on professional
probation for violations of the state's law, which, even after a recent liberalizing amendment, does not
legalize an abortion performed because of probable fetal deformity. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1968, at 32,
col. 8.
"George, supra note 26.
"I d. at 402.
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B. Views of the Medical Profession
The medical profession is divided on abortion, but the great majority of doctors
currently favor liberalization of the laws. In February and March of 1967, Modern
Medicine conducted a survey of the profession in which 40,089 questionnaires were
returned. Liberalization was favored by 94.6 per cent of the psychiatrists, by 83.7
per cent of the obstetricians and gynecologists, and by 86.9 per cent of all categories.
The Roman Catholic Church has been consistently opposed to liberalization, but 49.1
per cent of the doctors responding who identified themselves as Catholics answered
that they were in favor of broadening the grounds for abortion.
All doctors subscribe to the Hippocratic oath, the relevant section of which
appears to frown upon tampering with the processes of nature: "I will use treat-
ment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but never with a view
to injury and wrong doing. . . . I will not give to a woman a pessary to cause
abortion.... ." Notwithstanding the oath and the legal limitations in the statutes,
members of the medical profession, who necessarily come into close contact with the
tragic side of pregnancy as well as the happy side, are strongly committed to liberal-
izing the existing restrictions of the law.
C. Philosophical and Legal Views on Abortion
Mention has been made of the opposition of the Roman Catholic Church. It is
widely believed that abortion has always been forbidden by the Church, but this is
not borne out by history. Down to the reign of Pope Sixtus V (1585-9o) termination
of pregnancy was permitted within the first eighty days of pregnancy. Sixtus banned
all abortions, but was reversed following his death by Pope Gregory XIV, who
declared abortion illegal only after the fetus quickens. Not until 1869 did the
Church, through Pope Pius IX, revive the strict doctrines of Sixtus, and these doc-
trines remain in effect to the present day. The Church is currently the most effective
opponent of liberalization, though many Protestants take equivalent positions. Curi-
ously, public opinion surveys indicate that lay Catholics and non-Catholics are not
far apart in their views on abortion?'5
As of the present time views concerning liberalization of abortion laws range
throughout a wide spectrum. There are at least three widely divergent views, with
many minor variations of each. The three views are these:
i. Abortion is a form of murder. First, there are those who line up with the
Catholic Church and regard any interruption of a pregnancy as a crime, as murder.
This position is grounded upon the view that the fetus is a human life from the
at 29.1% favored abortion for illegitimacy, and 26.6% favored abortion for socioeconomic reasons.
Abortion: The Doctor's Dilemma, MoDE N MEDICINE, April 24, 1967, at 12, 13.
" Brody, Abortion, Once a Whispered Problem, Now a Public Debate, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1968, at
28, col. 5.
TIE ROLE OF LAW IN MEDICAL PROGRESS
moment of conception and that to destroy it wilfully cannot be justified except when
the mother's life is clearly jeopardized."0
z. Abortion should be a matter of free choice. At the opposite extreme are those
who believe that the doctor should be given freedom to act subject only to the usual
professional restraints; such a position would, of course, license the would-be mother
as well, since she would have no difficulty locating a willing doctor. An especially
radical position is that of the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California,
which contends that under the constitutional right of privacy established by the
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,37 the birth control case, it is for each
individual to determine when and whether to produce offspring3 8 Thus they would
argue that the present laws outlawing abortion are unconstitutional.
3. The Model Penal Code provision on abortion. In between the foregoing
extremes are those who take an intermediate position along the lines of the pro-
visions of the Model Penal Code, which was drafted by the American Law Institute
after ten years of study and is now ready for consideration by state legislatures. The
Code penalizes as a felony an unjustified termination of pregnancy and defines the
occasions for justification as belief that
there is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the mother or that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest or other
felonious intercourse. All illicit intercourse with a girl below the age of i6 shall
be deemed felonious 39
Under the Code the operation must be performed by a licensed physician in a
licensed hospital, and at least one other physician must join in a written certificate
setting forth the justifying circumstances.
This proposed liberalization of the abortion laws is a rather conservative com-
promise position that would, in fact, have but little effect on changing the present
status of illegitimate pregnancies or those of married couples who merely wish relief
for social or economic reasons. It is possible that it would do little more than codify
current practices of legitimate medical practitioners.
D. Impact of the Model Penal Code
The Code is already having substantial effect on current thinking in regard to
abortion laws. First, we note that the American Medical Association House of Dele-
gates, on June 21, 1967, voted to approve an official Association position allowing
abortions substantially in accord with the recommendations in the Model Penal
o" See, e.g., Harrington, Is Abortion a Crime?, TsuAt, June-July x967, at 42.
a73 81 U.S. 479 (1965)-
"' This conclusion was reached by the Southern California A.C.L.U. after a year of study by a
special committee of lawyers, sociologists, and doctors. See TRiM., June-July x967, at 40. The consti-
tutional argument is derived by extension of Griswold, which held that a state could not constitutionally
prohibit married couples from using, or obtaining advice on the use of, contraceptive devices.
" MODEL PENA. CODE § 230.8 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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Code' This was the first policy change on the subject by the AMA in ninety-six
years. In 1871, the Association had issued a policy statement to the effect that it
would be deemed unethical for a physician to induce abortion "without the con-
current opinion of at least one other physician, and then always with a view to the
safety of the child if that be possible." The AMA House of Delegates now calls
this announcement "antiquated and inadequate" for the purposes of 1967.
Until 1967, however, there had been no noticeable impact in legislative halls.
The draftsmen of the proposed Illinois Criminal Code advocated abortion provisions
paralleling the Model Code,4 but the legislature would have none of it. The drafts-
men of the proposed Minnesota Criminal Code included a somewhat similar pro-
vision in its revision, but the legislature rejected it.42 During 1967 similar legislation
died or was pigeonholed in a number of states, including Connecticut, Nevada,
Michigan, Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, and Tennessee, largely because
of vigorous opposition from the churches. In Indiana, the legislature passed a
liberalization bill, but the governor vetoed it.
The year 1967 was, however, the year of change. Three states adopted abortion
laws in substantial accord with the American Law Institute proposal. In April,
after stormy consideration, the Colorado legislature adopted, and on April 25 Gov-
ernor John A. Love signed, an act substantially similar to the Model Penal Code,43
allowing abortions where a three-member doctor board in an accredited hospital
agrees unanimously that (i) the pregnancy would result in the death of the mother
or serious, permanent impairment of her physical or mental health, or (2) the
child would likely be born with grave and permanent physical deformity or mental
retardation, or (3) the pregnancy resulted from forcible rape or incest or statutory
rape of a girl under sixteen years of age." The law contains no residency require-
ment. If the request is made by a married woman, the husband must concur.
o J.A.M.A., July Io, 1967, at 27, 38.
"Proposed ILL. REv. CraM. CODE § 32-I (Burdette-Smith ed. 1961).
42Proposed MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.345 (West ed. 1963), and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18 (1964).
"COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, art. 2, § 50 (1967). See N.Y. Times, April 26, 1967, at 48, coL.8.
4The question may be raised as to whether a statute legalizing abortion because of the likelihood
that the child may be born: with physical defect, may create a duty in the physician to warn the
expectant mother of the defect, and if she so desires, to abort her. In Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J.
22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), an expectant mother had German measles during her pregnancy, and her
child was born blind, deaf, and mute. The mother alleged that her physicians had failed to warn her
of the 20% chance that her child would be physically defective, and the court assumed for purposes of
discussion that had she known of this risk she could and would have obtained a lawful abortion.
The mother sought damages because an abortion would have freed her from the emotional problems
caused by raising a child with birth defects, and the father sought damages because it would have
been less expensive to abort rather than raise the child. The court denied recovery because "[t]he right
of their child to live is greater than and precludes their right not to endure emotional and financial
injury." Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. But cf. Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. x967),
where the court would allow recovery in an' action showing a negligent failure to sterilize which resulted
in pregnancy, even when the mother would suffer no harm, if there was a measurable economic loss to
the family resulting from the necessity of supporting and raising an additional child. Id. at 476.
In Gleitman, a claim brought on behalf of the child against the physician for damages resulting
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Some of the reactions to the Colorado law were violent. "It's a law against
motherhood," said one state legislator. "It's legalized state murder," said a min-
ister. "The whole world now finds Colorado available," said a doctor. "My fear
is that Colorado will become the abortion Mecca of America," said a state senator.
The pathway to liberalization is a thorny one.
The Colorado action was followed by the North Carolina legislature, which
disposed of the possibility of an "abortion Mecca" by adopting a four-month resi-
dency requirement "except in the case of emergency where the life of the said woman
is in danger."45 California has recently changed its statute to legalize an abortion
when the pregnancy threatens the physical or mental health of the mother, or when
the pregnancy resulted from forcible rape, incest, or statutory rape of a girl under
fifteen years of age.4 Unlike the statutes of Colorado and North Carolina, the
California act does not legalize an abortion performed because of probable fetal
deformity. The California Supreme Court may soon determine whether a preg-
nancy terminated because of fetal deformity is to be considered violative of the
existing law4 7
In New Jersey, action was taken not by the legislature, but by an organization
of county prosecutors. In a policy declaration with reference to the ii8-year-old
statute which penalizes abortions performed "without lawful justification," 4 the
prosecutors stated that an abortion should be considered legally justified when per-
formed by a physician "in good faith" and in accord with "accepted medical stan-
dards. '  Further, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recently stated "it may
well be that when a physician performs an abortion because of a good faith deter-
mination in accordance with accepted medical standards that an abortion is medically
indicated, the physician has acted with lawful justification within the meaning of
our statute and has not committed a crime."5  Thus, reform may begin in some
states whose legislatures have remained silent, through more liberal administrative
and judicial construction of existing laws.
from his physical defects was reduced to a claim "[tJhat he should not have been born at all." 49 N.J.
at 28, 227 A.2d at 692. No recovery was allowed because the privilege to live was thought to outweigh
the harm suffered by the child because of his defects. Presumably the same policy considerations could
govern a tort claim filed by a party raped, and upon whom an abortion is not performed, as well as
any claim filed by the resulting illegitimate child. See Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d
953 (Ct. Cl. x965), rev'd, I8 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d
906, 221 N.E.2d 181, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Advance Legislative Service 1967).
" CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2377 (WVest Supp. 1967); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-54
(West Supp. 1967); CAL. PENAL CODE § 274-76 (West Supp. 1967). The California act is discussed
in Leavy & Charles, Californids New Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Analysis and Guide to Medical and
Legal Procedure, x5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. I (1967).
'" See Leavy & Charles, supra note 46, at 25-27. For a favorable commentary on the California statute,
see generally Giannella, The Difficult Quest for a Truly Humane Abortion Law, 13 ViL.. L. REV. 257
(1968).
"N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2iA:87-I (1953).
"o N.Y. Times, June 24, 1967, at 31, col. 3.
"' Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 31, 227 A.2d 689, 694 (1967).
578 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Preliminary reports from Colorado indicate that the new legislation did not
significantly increase the number of legal abortions performed in the state,"1 and
the view has been expressed that nationwide liberalization of the law would result
in only perhaps iooo more legal abortions per year, roughly a ten per cent increase."2
If experience bears out these indications, several important conclusions would have
to be drawn: first, that physicians had been allowing their medical judgments to
override the old legal inhibitions to a most surprising degree; second, that the
benefits of adopting the Model Penal Code approach will accrue not so much to
patients in need of abortions as to the law itself, by improving physician's respect
for it; and, third, that the Model Penal Code approach would have practically no
impact on the large number of illegal abortions now being performed.
This final conclusion means that it is possible that the current abortion reform
movement will not be enough. One should not minimize the importance of
relieving physicians of the conflict between their sensed professional responsibility
and the law's proscription, but abortion will remain an important social problem.
The proposed reform is desirable in bringing the law into accord with medical
practice and medical ethics, but the law has an additional responsibility to accord
with societal mores. It may be that this additional responsibility will come to be
more and more felt.
Abortion reform is not confined to the United States. Of particular interest is
the English abortion law, approved by the House of Commons on October 26,
1967.53  An abortion will be legal if any two doctors agree that (i) the life of the
mother is threatened, (2) the mother's physical or mental health might be injured,
(3) any existing children might be mentally or physically injured, or (4) the child
born might suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously
handicapped. It is said that a major purpose served by the new law will be to
sanction abortion in cases where the family is large and over-crowded, or where the
strain on the mother which would be caused by raising an additional child would
be too great.54 As can be seen, the English reform legislation is more liberal than
its counterparts in the United States.
"I Brody, supra note 35, col. 2.
"'Helleger, Abortion, the Law and the Common Good, MEDICAL OPINION & REVIEW, May 1967,
at 76.
"'N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, z967, at I, col. 2.
"
4 Id. at 17, col. I. Other countries have encountered the abortion problem and have taken action
of a more or less liberal nature. In Sweden and Denmark, where abortion is much more easily obtained
than in most places in this country, the operation must still meet certain standards. The limits of
permissible abortion are about the same as those of the Model Penal Code, with the added stipulations
that in cases of "weakness" of the mother or when economic hardship could cause disintegration of the
family unit, the authorities would permit abortiof. Contrary to common belief in the United States,
abortions are not obtained merely for the asking by the pregnant female.
In Japan, Hungary, and the U.S.S.R., there is even greater liberality, the primary function of abortion
in Japan being birth control. There it is deemed in the national interest to control the birth rate and
therefore legal abortions are performed upon the request of the mother, often at state expense. There
is no legal, medical, religious, or social pressure upon her decision. In Japan it is said that one out
of every two pregnancies is interrupted by abortion.
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At any rate, the corner toward liberalization in the United States has been turned.
Some thirty states are currently reconsidering their abortion laws, and, despite opposi-
tion, many of them will soon adopt liberalizing measures.ss Even though the mod-
erate liberalization proposed by the Model Penal Code and now adopted by Colo-
rado, California, and North Carolina does not solve all problems presented by the
widespread demand for pregnancy termination, it does open the door to rationalizing
the performance of abortions in a manner consistent with a certain measure of
domestic contentment Moreover, it resolves for the conscientious doctor the dilemma
created by his normal desire to render medical assistance in case of need, on the one
hand, and his countervailing concern over violation of state criminal laws. The
process of modernizing the law in an area of vital concern to doctors has thus
begun. It is notable that it was an organization of lawyers, the American Law
Institute, that provided the impetus for this long-needed reform. Completing the
process of reform requires the efforts of both professions.
E. The Legislature's Role in Controlling Abortion
The existing gap between the legal standard on abortion and actual medical
practice demonstrates the severe limitations placed on the medical profession by
legislation which inhibits the doctor in exercising his medical judgment. Serious
questions can be raised about the extent to which legislatures should, as doctors often
put it, "come between" the physician and his patient, prescribing the type of medical
care that should or should not be given. Recently, for example, the New York legis-
lature heard conflicting medical testimony on the therapeutic values and dangers of
abortion in the process of deciding whether to amend the state's abortion law,56 and
it seems fair to question the competence of a legislature to weigh these matters.
Similar problems of delineating the proper legislative function exist in other areas,
such as euthanasia, sterilization, and the administration of drugs.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut,51 has created a con-
stitutional limit on legislative interference in the dispensing of medical advice. While
this case turned on the specially private interests of the recipients of the birth control
information, one can envision extensions of the principle to other areas where a
professionally qualified physician's relationship with the patient is encroached upon.
" The change will not come easily, for the opposition is potent and determined. The principal
arguments are that modern science regards the moment of conception as the beginning of a new life; that
the law owes a duty to protect this life; that its destruction should be prevented; that abortion constitutes
a condemnation to death without a trial; that the possibility of deformed babies is negligible; and that
the real solution lies in eliminating the causes of illegitimate pregnancies. See Harrington, supra note
36. The Georgia legislature has recently passed a liberalized law legalizing abortion if the mother's health
is threatened, when probable fetal deformity would result, and in cases of rape. The bill was waiting
for the approval of the governor at the date this issue went to press. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1968, at 32,
col. 8.
"' See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1967, at 24, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. i, 1967, at 18, col. i.
ST381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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We have already noted that the case has been cited by some as establishing the un-
constitutionality of abortion legislation.
8
There are recent indications that legislatures might elect repeal rather than
amendment of existing abortion laws as the most desirable means of accomplishing
the needed reform. For example, an official of the Minnesota Council for the Legal
Termination of Pregnancy was -recently quoted as saying, "I wouldn't be surprised
if several states including Minnesota soon repealed their abortion laws and left the
matter to physicians and their patients." '', And a leading Catholic authority, the
Reverend Robert F. Drinan, dean of the Boston College Law School, has recently
argued that repeal is morally preferable to amendment, since the latter course puts
the state in the position of deciding "who shall live and who shall die."'  Repeal
would at least leave the moral question in private hands. The case for repeal of
all laws affecting the performance of abortions by licensed physicians is just beginning
to be made, but it is becoming increasingly clear that the Model Penal Code is not
the final answer.
Abortion laws thus bring sharply into focus the problem of the role of law in
medical progress. A strong argument can be made that legislatures should confine
their efforts to (I) setting minimum standards for admission to medical practice,
(2) freeing doctors from unwarranted legal risks in providing for their patients (as
is the object of the Model Penal Code's provisions on abortion), while maintaining
standards of care and the legal remedies needed to protect the public, and (3) pro-
viding money to guarantee sound medical training and the best facilities and to extend
care to more citizens. It may be unrealistic, given the public's intense interest in
medical care, to expect legislatures to curb their own involvement, although hope
for repeal of abortion laws is rising, or to rely on the courts to restrict the law's
role in this way. Still, in any given legislative or judicial determination, the dem-
onstrated integrity of the medical profession will militate against extending legal
interference. Any demonstrated lack of integrity will, by the same token, be likely
to produce a legal response.
IV
PATIENT CONSENT TO THERAPY: THE PROBLEM OF INFORMED CONSENT
Over fifty years ago in Schloendorfi v. Society of New York Hospital,61 Judge
Benjamin Cardozo commented, "Every human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault for which
he is liable in damages."02  These words, written by a distinguished jurist, reveal
s See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
60 Brody, supra note 35, col. 2.
6
o1d., col. 6.
61211 N.Y. 125, o5 N.E. 92 (1914).
62 1d. at i29-3o, io5 N.E. at 93 (1914).
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one side of a coin, the possibility of the legal action for assault and battery; if the
case had called for it, Judge Cardozo probably would also have said that, if the
patient were a minor, or of unsound mind, any purported consent by him would
have been ineffective, and again there would have been an assault and battery.
A recent court, citing the Schloendorff opinion, stated that "If the consent given
to the operation in question was ineffectual, every phase of -the operation ... was
a continuing battery for which recovery should be allowed, even if the operation
had been successful." 3
On the other side of the legal coin there is something else, namely liability in
damages for negligence. We know that if a physician, having undertaken to render
medical service for a patient, in the course of treatment fails to utilize the degree
of skill and care that would be exercised by reputable practitioners of the same school
of practice in the community under similar circumstances, and injury follows, he is
liable in damages for breach of the prescribed standard of care-in short, for negli-
gence. This is the familiar action for medical malpractice.
Recent judicial decisions, utilizing language on both sides of the legal coin, have
brought forth the doctrine of "informed consent." Even if the physician has
obtained the patient's expressed consent to an operation or similar procedure, yet he
may have failed to furnish sufficient information about hazards, or alternative forms
of treatment, to enable the patient to give a meaningful reasoned or "informed"
consent. Because of this omission, the physician may become exposed to liability.
Under the traditional doctrine of assault and battery, the consent may be held in-
effective and the physician is liable to the patient for any damage incurred by the un-
permitted operation.6" Under the more recently evolved standard of malpractice, or
negligence, the physician is said to have a duty to disclose the risks inherent in the
operation or treament. This duty is presupposed by the standard of what other
reasonable medical practitioners in the community would have disclosed under
similar circumstances. Liability will follow if the patient can show that the harm
resulted from the breach."
"Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 366, 409 P.2d 74, 82 (1965), modified on other grounds,
2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966). However, if the operation is beneficial or harmless, only nominal
or very limited damages can be recovered. Lacey v. Laird, x66 Ohio Rep. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (x956);
Keister v. O'Neil, 59 Cal. App. 2d 428, 138 P.2d 723 (1943).
" Conceptually it could be argued that failure to disclose a particular risk invalidates the patient's
consent for all purposes and that the operation is therefore an assault and battery, regardless of whether
the undisclosed risk actually materialized. Nevertheless, lack of informed consent seems to result in
liability only for injuries resulting from risks which should have been but were not disclosed.
o In applying these two theories, the courts appear to be either confused or little concerned with
distinguishing the grounds of recovery. Thus in one leading case, Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,
350 P.2d 1093 (196o), rehearing denied but opinion explained, 187 Kan. i86, 354 P.2d 67o (ig6o),
it was charged that the court in its first opinion had confused malpractice with assault and battery,
"giving rise to a hybrid action which is neither one of negligence nor of assault and battery, but may be
a combination of the two." x87 Kan. at x87, 354 P.2d at 671. It has been stated, "Unfortunately, the
leading cases dealing with the failure of a surgeon to warn of inherent risks do not always make it
clear as to what theory supports recovery, when recovery is permitted." Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App.
358, 363, 409 P.2d 74, 79 (,965), modified on other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966).
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From the foregoing it is dear that a proper informed consent is an important
defense-an insulation from legal liability-available to physicians and surgeons,
but that, in the absence of such consent, any invasion of the body or mind of
another person, even though accompanied by the utmost in medical skill, may
become an actionable wrong. This doctrine relating to consent is important to the
medical profession in two principal contexts: (i) in professional therapy for sick
patients and (2) in clinical research involving the use of human subjects in seeking
new medical knowledge. Many volumes of case law have been written through the
years involving malpractice for failure to exercise the required skill and care in
rendering medical services, but there are comparatively few cases involving liability
for failure to inform and obtain the required consent from the patient receiving
medical treatment, and none at all concerned with the human subject in medical
research.
We shall develop further the requirement of informed consent-which, when it
is met, will serve to insulate doctors from the hardships of the courtroom. Possibly
we can see how the concept can be sharpened and its use facilitated for the benefit
of both lawyers and doctors. In the remainder of this section we shall be considering
only those aspects of informed consent that apply to cases of therapy for sick patients.
In the following section, we shall turn to its use in connection with experimentation
on human subjects.
As already indicated, the law on consent to treatment is of recent vintage and
is not fully developed. An ill person who calls upon a doctor for treatment is
entitled, except in certain emergencies, to a diagnosis, a prognosis, and a statement
of the proposed therapy, together with a statement of the hazards, if any, and the
expected results or effect upon health or person to be anticipated from the treatment
of his medical problem.6 The patient's request for medical services carries with it
implied consent to all conventional, nonoperative procedures indicated for his
diseased condition. 7 But if the physician finds that such procedures will not
effect a cure, he may in the exercise of his own professional judgment decide that
an operation is needed, or he may wish to try some new and unconventional treat-
ment or drug in which he has confidence. Before doing either of these things he
A cause of action asserting an assault and battery does not preclude recovery based upon malpractice
for failure to disclose risks. See Woods v. Brumlop, 7V N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962) (plaintiff's claim
was based upon two theories: failure to inform of danger in electroshock treatment, and lack of consent
because of not being informed of the danger); Mayor v. Dowsett, 240 Ore. 196, 400 P.2d 234 (965)
(when ari action for assault and battery was barred because the statute of limitations had run, the court
treated the action as one for malpractice: "[T]he operation might constitute a technical battery, but it
would still be a violation of the established standard of care and actionable as malpractice." Id. at 233,
400 P.2d at 251); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967) ("Regardless of what some earlier
informed consent cases suggest, such an action need not be pleaded as one for assault and battery." Id.
at 302.) See also Gravis v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., 415 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. x967).
"Morse, Legal Implications of Clinical InvestigationS, 20 VAND. L. Ray. 747, 749 (x967) (especially
the cases cited in nn.8-io).
7 B. S'IARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW oF MaDscAI. PRAcIricE § 1-o6 (x959).
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must, unless the circumstances are exceptional, obtain the patient's expressed and
informed consent to the operation or to the use of an experimental drug or treat-
ment.
There are certain exceptions. Occasionally, the doctor may deem it desirable
to withhold distressing information, as from a critically ill cancer patient. This may
be justifiable, and in such cases informed consent may be omitted. The same is true
if full explanation of the material facts is impossible because of emergency condi-
tions, or if the facts are deemed emotionally so upsetting under the circumstances as
to prejudice the treatment. Otherwise, before the doctor tries either ordinary opera-
tive measures or some unconventional treatment or procedure, the law requires that
the consent be obtained and that it be preceded by informing the patient of the
essential material facts, including in reasonable detail the means and methods of
the proposed treatment, the inconveniences and risks involved, and the possible effects
upon his health or person. Sometimes the doctor goes ahead without requesting a
consent to the procedure involved, creating a potential lawsuit.6 8
Judicial decisions are attempting to fill in the foregoing general outline of the
law on informed consent. One important question is whether the information
furnished the patient must, in order to make the consent valid, include all of the
facts and risks which the patient contends that he should have known, or whether
it will suffice to give him only those that would be supplied by other reputable
and reasonable physicians in the community under the same or similar circum-
stances. Is the latter a necessary standard against which to judge the physician's
disclosure?
The Kansas Supreme Court in Natanson v. Kline69 threw light on this matter.
The court was confronted with an action for damages against a radiologist and the
hospital in which he was giving radioactive cobalt treatments. The plaintiff
received such treatments in connection with a mastectomy operation and damage
ensued. The doctor was not chargeable with failure to exercise proper professional
skill in the treatments, but negligence was claimed because of his failure to inform
her of the hazards. The court in its two opinions charted some new ground. It
held that the duty to disclose existed but qualified it by saying:
08 On occasion, absent express consent, an implied consent may be derived from the peculiar facts.
See Haywood v. Allen, 406 S.W.2d 721 (Ky. Ct. App. March 25, 1966, as modified on denial of rehear-
ing, Oct. 14, 1966), where suit was brought against a physician for damages for the allegedly unauthorized
tying off of the patient's Fallopian tubes in the course of a Caesarean section. The patient did not ex-
pressly consent to the tubal ligation, but there was discussion of its possibility as a "package deal" and
there was a tacit understanding that the ligation should be done unless the patient should affirmatively
tell the surgeon that she did not want it done. It was held that the surgeon was entitled to act on the
basis of implied consent. Compare Carroll v. Chapman, 139 So. 2d 61 (La. Ct. App. 1962) and Shulman
v. Lerner, 2 Mich. App. 705, 141 N.E.2d 348 (1966) with Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn.
427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
as x86 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (ig6o), rehearing denied but opinion explained, 187 Kan. 186, 354
P.2d 67o (596o).
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The duty of the physician to disclose, however, is limited to those disclosures which
a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circum-
stances. How the physician may best discharge his obligation to the patient in this
dificult situation involves primarily a question of medical judgment °
A subsequent Kansas case involved a claim of malpractice by the parents of a minor
who had undergone cardiac catheterization. In response to the allegation by plain-
tiffs that they had been told that in previous cardiac catheterizations there had not
been any trouble, the court again held that the standard of the reasonable medical
practitioner governed disclosure-'
It is clear that in an action for negligence or malpractice, the standard of dis-
closure elaborated upon by the Kansas court is the prevailing view, 2 and is sub-
stantially the same standard as that applied in a case of failure to exercise the proper
degree of professional skill. On the other hand, the question may be raised as to
whether this standard should be utilized in the action alleging lack of valid consent
to an assault and battery. In this legal area there is less of a theoretical basis for
looking to what other doctors similarly situated might have done.
Strictly speaking, an action for assault and battery raises only the issue of the
patient's awareness, yet we do not expect the physician to suggest every risk factor nor
do we demand a complete explanation of his medical decision, based as it is on
various alternative modes of treatment and their relative probabilities of success.
The courts have attempted to solve the problem in at least three ways: (x) by
requiring only a general awareness of the risks on the part of the plaintiff,7 (2) by
simply submitting the question of consent as a fact issue to the jury without formu-
lating any express standard,74 or (3) by applying the negligence or malpractice
standard of the reasonable practitioner 5 It would seem that there must be some
standard of reasonableness applied to determine the risks of which the patient must
be informed and that questions of medical judgment are intimately involved in
determining the fact of risk itself. The courts ought not to insist too rigidly on
following the assault and battery rationale7" and should apply the standard of the
reasonable medical practitioner in all cases involving consent issues.
TO 186 Kan. at 409, 350 P.2d at zio6.
5
'Williams v. Mcnihan, x91 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963); accord, Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390,
424 P.2d 488 (z967).
" See, e.g., Wilsonf v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358,
409 P.2d 74 (1965), modified on other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (x966); Aiken v. Clary,
396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, i19 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Govin v.
Hunter, 374 P.2d 421 (Wyo. x962).
" "[A] consent to a surgical procedure is effectual if the consentor understands substantially the
nature of the surgical procedure attempted and the probable results of the operation .... ." Shetter v.
Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 369, 409 P.2d 74, 86 (1965), modified on other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607,
411 P.2d 45 (1966).
"'Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
" Di Fillippio v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
"See, e.g., Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); Aikin v. Clary, 396 SAV.2d 668
(Mo. 1965); Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421 (Wyo. x962).
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No doubt this same principle should also be applied to the statements of the
other essential elements of "informed consent"--for example, the sufficiency of the
statements with respect to the method and means of procedure to be used and the in-
conveniences as well as the risks involved and, in particular, the amount of detail
which the doctor must give to the patient. How much detail would reputable and
reasonable practitioners give under similar circumstances? Would they speculate
about remote possibilities or picture the most distressing possible effects? The
information imparted must certainly include the more prominent features, those
most likely to affect the decision of the patient to proceed or not to proceed 77 How-
ever, the reasonable practitioner probably would not detail the one-in-io,ooo possi-
bilities or go into the more frightening aspects that, though remote, might deter the
patient unnecessarily7 Unfortunately no iron-clad rule can be formulated; each
case must be determined according to its own facts.
There are certain other elements to be considered. There is the question of
capacity to consent, but that we shall discuss in the next section of this article.
There is also the question of the manner of making proof. If the action is given the
label of an assault and battery based upon complete absence of effective consent,
lay testimony could be used to prove the deficiency, but if the action is based upon
inadequacy of information furnished, i.e., on negligence, then the medical standards
of the community come into the case, and the plaintiff will have to offer expert
testimony in proof. ° If, as has been suggested, the standard of the reasonable
physician is to be applied in all cases, then the plaintiff will always be required to
introduce expert testimony to determine that standard. Because of the "conspiracy
of silence" this may cause the plaintiff greater difficulty than the defendant, who will
doubtless be able to get other doctors to testify in his defense. As a mitigating factor,
the courts have ruled as a matter of law that the standard has been violated when
the physician either is silent as to the possibility of risk,"' or assures the patient that
no danger could result, if in fact this is known by the physician to be an untrue
statement."' In these situations, the plaintiff will not be required to offer expert
testimony to prove his case, and the burden may be upon the defendant physician
77The standard was found violated by a failure to inform a patient of the 3% risk of death, paralysis,
or other injury in an arteriogram procedure, Bowers v. Talmadge, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963),
and by a failure to disclose the i% chance of loss of hearing in a stapedectomy with a vein graft (ear
operation). Wilson v. Scott, 42 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
"s The reasonable medical practitioner would not inform the parents of a child of the remote possibility
that the child might revive from the anesthesia and, in the course of his ensuing struggle, cause a
catheter to puncture his heart. Williams v. Menihan, 19I Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963).
" See, e.g., Williams v. Menihan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d
668 (Mo. 1965).
"Collins v. Meeker, z98 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488 (1967); Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. x86, 354
P.2d 670 (i96o); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d ii (Mo. i96o), distinguished in Aiken v. Clary,
396 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Mo. 1965).
"Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.ad 520 (1962).
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to prove that his failure to disclose did, in fact, conform to accepted professional
standards.82
As a final element, a mere showing of negligence will not suffice to establish
liability. The plaintiff must also show proximate cause, and in this context this
means that he must prove that he would not have undergone the operation or pro-
cedure if he had been fully informed of the risk. 3 The subjective element is large,
and it may simply be a jury question as to the credibility of plaintiff's testimony to
this effect."4
We are discussing in general "the role of law in medical progress." In our
consideration of the subjects of homotransplants and abortion, the law was seen as
the benefactor of medicine by clearing the way. Candor compels the observation that
the legally evolved doctrine of informed consent may well operate otherwise. It
may add to the frustrations felt by doctors toward the law, lawyers, and the courts
by seeming to create a disguised and dangerous pitfall into which a relatively innocent
practitioner may inadvertently tumble. Possibly more extensive nonlitigious and
objective intellectual cooperation between the professions, in institutes, conferences,
joint publishing efforts, or otherwise, could hammer out the standards in terms of
specifics and thus smooth the path toward better mutual understanding than that
pictured by Dr. Child. 5
V
THE SUBJECT'S CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
We have already noted the importance of informed consent in the situation where
the doctor elects to employ an experimental drug or treatment.8" In these instances
the physician's goal and the patient's hopes coincide, and consent only serves the
purpose of alerting the patient to the unusual risks that may be involved. In this
section we will be concerned with the possibility of unhappy results where the experi-
ment in which the patient or other volunteer participates holds out little or no hope
of benefit to him. Such nontherapeutic experiments may involve healthy persons
who volunteer to become guinea pigs for the sake of making contributions to medical
science or persons who are paid for their participation. If injury results from such
experimentation, the possibility of a damage suit again rears its head.
82 Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488 (x967). But see Comment, Informed Consent in
Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. Ray. 1396 (1967), in which it is argued that the physician should
always have the initial burden of proof when he makes less than a full disclosure of all known material
risks.
" Compare Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (196o) and Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz.
App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966) with Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. x965), where the court held
that, while the plaintiff did not have to show that he would not have consented had he been fully
informed, "this does not mean, however, that plaintiff is not required to establish a causal connection
between the doctor's failure sufficiently to inform and the injury for which recovery is sought." Id. at
676.
"'See Russell v. Hardwick, i66 So. 2d 904 (Fla. Ct. App. x964).
"
5 Note 3 supra and accompanying text.
" See p. 582 supra.
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For the paid subjects, the primary benefit is the monetary reward. For the others,
there is generally no benefit other than satisfaction of a possible desire to promote
the general welfare. Not many persons are willing to put up with personal injury or
even serious inconvenience either for the typically meager compensation provided
or for the sake of the advancement of medical science. In such cases, moreover, in
obtaining informed consent there can be no special considerations, such as emergency
conditions or patient apprehension, warranting the investigator in withholding in-
formation or not obtaining consent. Accordingly the law should not and does not
provide these excuses for failing to do so. So far as can be ascertained, there are
no decided cases on the subject, but it seems practically certain that there will be
such in the future. We must assume that the medical investigator will be held
liable in damages if he does not make a proper disclosure and obtain an effective
consent. Otherwise his action exposes him to liability, and if something goes wrong
he must be held -responsible. It has been said that he experiments at his peril, and
this is certainly true unless consent has been obtained. We must ask, however, what
is the necessary disclosure and what is an effective consent 87
At the outset we should note again that experimentation on a human subject
without first obtaining an informed consent has especially pronounced moral aspects,
as well as those of a strictly legal nature.88 This moral aspect is even more im-
portant when the experimentation involves, as it often does, children, mental in-
competents, students, prisoners, nurses, employees, and others who may be handi-
capped or subject to pressure in consenting to the experimentation. In such cases
the moral aspects will have a direct bearing upon development of legal conclusions0s
A. Existing Codes, Standards, and Rules
We should first look at some of the ideas on the subject that have emerged in
recent years in the form of specific codes and rules. Ever since the Nuremberg trials
brought to light the wretched practices of the Nazis in Germany, the concern of
interested persons and organizations has brought forth a variety of stated principles
and rules to govern the use of human subjects in nontherapeutic medical investi-
gation. 0 Most of these have come from the medical profession itself. In the en-
suing paragraphs we review the several principal efforts briefly and chronologically.
A gradual evolution of ideas and refinement of principles have taken place.
" Although the courts have not spoken, there is an impressive body of medical and legal literature
on the subject. See, e.g., I. LAnsrni. & R. NEwmA, CLmNICAL INVESTIGATION IN MEDICINE (1963), which
collects numerous materials and provides an extensive bibliography; and later references cited in Fletcher,
Human Experimentation: Ethics in the Consent Situation, in this symposium, p. 620, n.2.
See generally Fletcher, supra note 87.
8 0 Professor Paul A. Freund, of Harvard Law School, discussing the moral aspects, has suggested, "In
the end we may have to accept the fact that some limits do exist to the search for knowledge." Freund,
Is the Law Ready for Human Experimentation?, TRIAL, Oct.-Nov. 1966, at 46, 49.
" Many of the codes and stated principles are collected in I. LADIMER & R. NEWmAN, supra note 87.
See also Fletcher, supra note 87, at 628-31.
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The Nuremberg Articles (19 46).'- These Articles, drafted by a committee of
the American Medical Association, comprise ten points, set up in the form of
accepted and established principles to deal with nontherapeutic research. They were
prepared as a guide for the Nuremberg tribunals in trying the Nazi criminals. The
Articles call for voluntary consent by each subject of experimentation; they demand
that human subjects be used only when fruitful results for the good of society un-
procurable by other means may be promoted; experiments must be based upon prior
animal experimentation and upon knowledge of the natural history of the prob-
lem; unnecessary physical and mental suffering must be avoided; there must be no
experiments involving the likelihood of death or disabling injury; the risk must
be set off against and must not exceed the humanitarian importance of the project;
proper preparation and facilities must be provided; scientifically qualified investi-
gators must be used; the subject of investigation must be free to withdraw at any
time; and assurance must be given that the investigators will terminate the project
at any time if it seems to be getting out of hand. This code was excellently framed
for its purpose, to deal with the Nuremberg criminals. It did not, however, purport
to settle all questions or even to be a guide for future experimental practices.
American Medical. Association, Principles of Medical Ethics (i 9 4 6).92  The
Association adopted some but by no means all of the principles of the Nuremberg
Code. A report prepared by its Judicial Council was approved by the House of Dele-
gates in December 1946. The report sets up the following requirements for clinical
investigations on human beings: "(i) the voluntary consent of the person on whom
the experiment is to be performed must be obtained; (2) the danger of each experi-
ment must have been investigated previously by means of animal experimentation;
and (3) the experiment must be performed under proper medical protection and
management."
National Institutes of Health, Guiding Principles in Medical Research Involving
Humans (1953).93  A clearance procedure required for projects deviating from
accepted medical practice incorporated the idea of group review of the scientific and
ethical propriety of each project. The desirability of group review of nontherapeutic
experiments is now generally recognized and is uniformly utilized in greater or lesser
degree in all reputable centers. 4
Public Health Council of the Netherlands, Report on Human Experimentation
(i 955).Y5 In a published summary of a report submitted by the Council to the Nether-
"1 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremburg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No.
10, 2 THE MEDICAL CASE 18i (949), reprinted in Beecher, Experimentation in Man, 169 J.A.M.A.
461, 472-74 (1959)-
92 132 J.A.M.A. 1090 (1946).
,
9 Ladimer, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical Research on Human Beings, 3 J. PUB. L. 467, 496
(x954)-
D' See Sessoms, What Hospitals Should Know About Investigational Drugs: Guiding Principles in
Medical Research Involving Humans, 32 J. AM. Hosp. Ass'N 44, 62, 64 (X958).
"
9 Reprinted in I. LArnMER & R. NEwmAN, supra note 87, at 156-58.
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lands Minister on Social Affairs and Health, the following principle was included
in a listing of "standards."
Experiments on children; in institutions for children, old people, etc.; on the in-
sane; or on prisoners, which involve dangerous risks, inconvenience or pain are not
approved. All experiments on the dying under any circumstances are disapproved.
American Psychological Association, Ethical Standards of Psychologists (i9 59 )Y0
The eighteen "principles" in this formulation brought out, among other points, the
need for confidentiality of information about individual subjects of experimentation.
The following was included as a limitation on research to be conducted:
Principle i6. Harmful Aftereffects. Only when a problem is significant and can
be investigated in no other way is the psychologist justified in giving misinformation
to research subjects or exposing research subjects to physical or emotional stress.
a. When the possibility of serious aftereffects exists, research is conducted only
when the subjects or their responsible agents are fully informed of this possi-
bility and and volunteer nevertheless.
Medical Research Council (Great Britain), Responsibility in Investigations on
Human Subjects (i962-63).7 This statement is intended to serve as a guide for
medical men engaged in research. With procedures not of direct benefit to the indi-
vidual, it acknowledges the possibility of "undue influence," particularly when the
investigator stands in a special relationship to the subject, such as a physician-patient
relationship. It suggests that the investigator should obtain the consent while in the
presence of another person to protect himself, and for the protection of the subject.
The statement concludes as follows:
Owing to the special relationship of trust that exists between a patient and his
doctor, most patients will consent to any proposal that is made. Further, the con-
siderations involved in a novel procedure are nearly always so technical as to pre-
vent their being adequately understood by one who is not himself an expert. It must
therefore be frankly recognized that, for practical purposes, an inescapable moral
responsibility rests with the doctor concerned for determining what investigations
are, or are not, proposed to a particular patient or volunteer ....
In the opinion of the Council, the head of a department where investigations
on human subjects take place has an inescapable responsibility for ensuring that
practice by those under his direction is irreproachable.
World Medical Association, Code of Ethics (Declaration of Helsinki, i 9 64 ). 8
This is an important document, second only to the Nuremberg Articles in worldwide
influence. It constitutes a fairly complete ethical code to guide medical experi-
go 14 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 279 (1959).
7 2 BRIT. MED. J. 178 (1964).
" Reprinted in 2 BIT. MED. J. 177 (1964); Morse, Legal Implications of Clinical Investigations,
20 VAin. L. REv. 747, 768-69 (1967). The Declaration has been approved by the American Medical
Association, the American Federation for Clinical Research, the American College of Physician's, the
American College of Surgeons, the Society for Pediatric Research, and the American Academy of Pediatrics.
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menters in conducting clinical research. The Declaration draws the important dis-
tinction between purely scientific experimentation, presumably on normal persons,
and experimentation for therapeutic purposes carried out on patients under the
doctor's care, patients whose illness does not yield to conventional treatments. More
exacting standards are imposed for the former than for the latter. The provisions
concerning nontherapeutic research are as follows:
(i) In the purely scientific application of clinical research carried out on a human
being it is the duty of the doctor to remain the protector of the life and health of
that person on whom clinical research is being carried out.
(2) The nature, the purpose and the risk of clinical research must be explained to
the subject by the doctor.
(3a) Clinical research on a human being cannot be undertaken without his free
consent after he has been informed; if he is legally incompetent, the consent of the
legal guardian should be procured.
(3b) The subject of clinical research should be in such a mental, physical and legal
state as to be able to exercise fully his power of choice.
(3c) The consent should as a rule be obtained in writing. However, the responsi-
bility for clinical research always remains with the research worker; it never falls
on the subject even after consent is obtained.
(4a) The investigator must respect the right of each individual to safeguard his
personal integrity, especially if the subject is in a dependent relationship to the
investigator.
(4 b) At any time during the course of clinical research the subject or his guardian
should be free to withdraw permission for the research to be continued. The in-
vestigator or the investigating team should discontinue the research if in his or
their judgment it may, if continued, be harmful to the individual.
This formulation contains a number of novel expressions of the interests and duties
involved in human experimentation.
The Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (1 9 62). 0
These amendments, which were precipitated largely by the thalidomide tragedies,
and the Food and Drug Administration regulations implementing them, established
detailed "informed consent" requirements applicable to the testing of investigational
drugs that are to be shipped across state lines. Although the provisions apply only
to new drugs, they are nevertheless persuasive with respect to and in connection
with fixing standards for experimental processes that do not involve such drugs.
FDA regulations specifically require consent in all cases of scientific investigation
and in all but "exceptional cases" (emergency, apprehension, etc.) in therapy situa-
tions. Consent is carefully defined as follows:
"Consent" or "informed consent" means that the person involved has legal
capacity to give consent, is so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice,
and is provided with a fair explanation of all material information concerning the
19 Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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administration of the investigational drug, or his possible use as a control, as to
enable him to make an understanding decision as to his willingness to receive said
investigational drug. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of any
affirmative decision by such person the investigator should make known to him the
nature, duration, and purpose of the administration of said investigational drug;
the method and means by which it is to be administered; all inconveniences and
hazards reasonably to be expected, including the fact, where applicable, that the
person may be used as a control; the existence of alternative forms of therapy, if any;
and the effect upon his health or person that may possibly come from the admin-
istration of the investigational drug. Said patient's consent shall be obtained in
writing by the investigator. 0 0
Notable new elements here are the requirement that consent be in writing and that
the subject's possible use as a control be revealed to him.
US. Public Health Service, Policy and Procedure Order No. 129 (1966).101 This
is a directive, a "guideline," prescribing procedures for experimentation under Public
Health Service grants-in-aid of research. It requires institutional group review of all
projects to assure the protection of the "rights and welfare" of individuals involved,
the appropriateness of the methods used to obtain informed consent, and the objective
appraisal of the risks as balanced against the potential medical benefits of the investi-
gation. The institutions reviewing the research must also assure continuing sur-
veillance of projects and must provide continuing advice for investigators especially
with respect to the safeguarding of the rights and welfare of human subjects. The
possibility of withholding grants-in-aid is a powerful sanction. The stated standards
apply literally only to projects carried on under the PHS grants, but they will doubt-
less be applied more broadly. This directive emphasizes strongly both the legal and
the ethical obligations connected with nontherapeutic experimentation on normal
humans.
American Medical Association, House of Delegates, Ethical Guidelines for
Clinical Investigation (1966) °2 This document, referring to previous action en-
dorsing the Declaration of Helsinki, enlarges upon the fundamental concepts by
setting up some important "guidelines." It is a significant document with especially
thoughtful differentiation between therapeutic and nontherapeutic experimenta-
tion.'0 3 It includes some original handling of the problem of experimentation on
minors and incompetents.
100 21 C.F.R. § 130.37 (x967).
101 Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Investigations
Involving Human Subjects, Including Clinical Research: Requirements for Review to Insure the Rights
and Welfare of Individuals, PPO I29, Revised Policy July 1, 1966.
"
2 American Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki and AMA Ethical Guidelines for Clinical
Investigation (undated pamphlet printed by the AMA).
"' The provisions on these subjects are quoted in Fletcher, supra note 87, at 629. The experimenter's
role vis-h-vis the patient was defined thus:
2. In conducting clinical investigation, the investigator should demonstrate the same concern and
caution for the welfare, safety and comfort of the person involved as is required of a physician who
is furnishing medical care to a patient independent of any clinical investigation.
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B. Comments on Existing Codes, Standards, and Rules
The foregoing are the principal existing codes and rules. They represent much
professional soul-searching, and when viewed historically serve to illustrate how
the medical profession has come to grips with the problems. Many of the essential
rules and standards can be distilled from them; yet they still do not fully serve to meet
some of the most troublesome problems encountered in the course of medical experi-
mentation. Large gaps remain, and important questions are unanswered. Let us list
some of the questions and, where possible, undertake to suggest some tentative
answers.
i. Identifying Risks and Duties With Greater Precision
Should not some kind of line be drawn between procedures that consist only of
observation of natural functions of the subject, with no attendant risks or negligible
risks, and those that involve affirmative invasion of mind or body to modify the
functions for the purposes of the experiment, with something more than negligible
risk? Comparatively unrestricted authority might be in order as to the former, but
careful laying out of the ground rules would be indicated for the latter. The former
could include all manner of superficial measurements and tests, even including X-rays,
electrocardiagrams, electroencephalograms, simple blood tests, and so forth. The
latter would include the administration of many drugs, certain biopsies, and material
alterations of bodily or mental functions in some manner. The former generally in-
volve no significant risk, the latter otherwise in varying degrees.
But can a line necessarily be drawn between the two? Is a skin biopsy "observa-
tional" and a kidney biopsy "invasional"? Is violent exercise to observe heart
function just observational? And what about the varying degrees of risk? Can
meaningful lines be drawn? Or is each case dependent upon its own facts? Doctors
must tell us whether meaningful lines can be drawn and whether the spectrum of
degree of risk can be usefully illustrated by common examples. If the existing
general principles can be made more specific in this manner, this would be a valuable
guide for use in the design of research projects, in selecting human subjects, in duly
informing them of risks, and eventually, if need should arise, in the courts.
2. Defining Disclosure Requirements
The American Medical Association "Ethical Guidelines" call for a "reasonable
explanation" of the "nature" of the procedure to be used and of the "risks to be
expected." This raises several questions. We might ask: reasonable to whom, the
investigator, the human subject, or some hypothetical "reasonable man"? Does
"nature of the procedure" include duration and purpose of the project as required
in the Food and Drug Administration regulations? Do "risks" include "incon-
veniences"? Do they include the one-in-io,ooo possibility of injury? What about
risks that are not reasonably to be expected to occur?
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The expressed standard, "reasonable explanation," is perhaps as satisfactory as
any that can be devised, but it badly needs embellishment.104 Since nontherapeutic
experimentation by definition does not benefit the subject affected, the standard of
the reasonable medical practitioner that is applied when a doctor is caring for a sick
patient will doubtless not be available, and the informed consent will be judged on
recognized contract principles. This means that failure of the experimenter to
disclose facts that the "reasonable man" would want to know before serving as the
subject of experimentation will vitiate the consent. This standard may differ greatly
from what a "reasonable investigator" would have revealed under the circumstances.
For one thing, the jury's role would be ostensibly greater under the "reasonable
man" standard and expert testimony would be largely dispensed with in establishing
whether a duty had been breached.
3. Evaluating the Voluntariness of Consent Obtained
We find that the consent must be "voluntary"; the person involved must be "so
situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice"-so say the Nuremberg Articles,
the American Medical Association "Guidelines," and the FDA Regulations. But
when is consent truly voluntary? When is it the result of a free power of choice?
Even with a normal adult the question may be raised by opening up a great range
of psychoanalytic possibilities with which the law probably ought not to concern
itself. But even setting these matters aside, consider the following possibilities:
Children. What about the use of children as subjects of experimentation? If
the child has reached the age of understanding so that he can appreciate the in-
conveniences and risks, his consent together with that of his parents should suffice,
or perhaps at some age short of majority his own consent becomes sufficient, as it
would be in case of needed therapy.10 5 But what about children who are too young,
""4 Under the present formulation shocking action can be taken even in seemingly good causes. In
Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 42 Misc. 2d 427, 248 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd per
euriam, 21 App. Div. 495, 25 N.Y.S.2d 818, ret'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397, 2o6 N.E.2d 338
(1965), a substance derived from cancer cells was injected into chronically ill patients, who were told only
that they would receive a harmless substance which might cause some discomfort. In a separate proceeding
the doctors were disciplined on the ground that this was not enough information to satisfy the informed
consent requirement. See Langer, Human Experimentation: New York Verdict Affirms Patients' Rights,
151 Sc. 663 (1966).
10 RESTATEMENT o ToRTs § 59, comment a at iii (1939), dealing with therapy situations, states as
follows:
"If a child or person of deficient mental condition, though under guardianship, is capable of
appreciating the nature, extent and consequences of the invasion, his assent prevents the invasion
from creating liability, though assent of the parent, guardian or other person is not obtained or is
expressly refused. If the invasion is one the nature, extent and consequences of which the child or
person of deficient mental condition is incapable of appreciating, the invasion creates a liability
unless the parent, guardian or other person: [standing in like relation] has consented, in which
case the consent of the parent, guardian or other person, if it be within his power to give it,
is effective though the child objects to the invasion."
Although this comment is addressed to therapy situations, it is possible that the same principle might
apply to experimentation.
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who cannot understand the material facts-the infants just born, the eight-year-olds?
Obviously they cannot give "informed" consent. May the parents consent for them?
In case of needed treatment for illness the parents can, of course, consent. There is
less justification for validating the parental consent in the case of nontherapeutic
investigation for the benefit of medical science. But because of the public's interest
in the advance of medical science, the door to the use of infants should not be com-
pletely closed so that research in diseases and conditions of infants cannot be con-
ducted. New guidelines and possibly special safeguards are called for. Observa-
tional procedures would be unobjectionable, but procedures that involve significant
dangers to the mind or body should certainly be controlled if not prohibited. 0
Pisoners. Can a "voluntary" consent be obtained from prisoners? Or are
institutional pressures inevitable and such as to preclude freedom of choice. Federal
prisoners are used in considerable numbers by federal investigators. In Iowa, prisoners
may be used, but they must volunteer in writing and may withdraw consent at any
time.07 In Virginia, prisoners are permitted to participate in medical research under
regulations prescribed by the State Board of Prisons. 0 8 Prisoners have time on their
hands, and many of them might welcome medical experimentation as a means of
gaining a little variety in their daily routines and some self-respect. If no pressures
are exerted, if no special parole favors are held out as bait (although serving as a
subject can constitute favorable evidence on the parole record), and if freedom to
withdraw at any time is preserved, there would seem to be good justification for use
of adult prisoners who consent after being reasonably informed.
Mental incompetents. Much the same questions arise with mental incompetents
as in connection with children except that the possibilities are somewhat more favor-
able for using them in the process of needed therapy. They certainly should not be
used without consent of a parent or guardian. Consent of the institutional authorities
is, of course, necessary, but not sufficient. Again some carefully drawn guidelines
would be helpful.
Students, nurses, or employees. If these subjects are adults the only question is
that introduced by possible pressures. Can they really exert freedom of choice?
Or will the hope of better grades or job preferment exert undue influence? If pres-
sures cannot be eliminated these persons should not be used. Guidelines would
help, but the matter defies precise definition.
Paid subjects. A financial reward prompts further concern that consent is not
voluntary, that economic need may have overcome the patient's judgment. The
problem seems closely akin to the case of prisoners, students, nurses, and employees,
but it has not been spelled out in any of the published principles. This would seem
to be an area where guidelines could be used to point out the potential for abuse.
"0" See Freund, supra note 89, at 46-49; Morse, supra note 98, at 757.
10 IOWA CODE ANN. § 246.47 (Supp. 1966).
"'
8 VA. CODE ANN. § 53-57.1 (Supp. I966).
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4. The Future.
With the vast increase in medical experimentation on human beings and the
likelihood of personal damage to subjects of experimental procedures, we may be
sure that some type of regulation is inevitable. One or two unfortunate occurrences
will precipitate it. What form will this regulation take? Statutes adopted by state
legislatures are not likely to prove satisfactory. They are not adopted in a scientific
atmosphere. Moreover, they are usually too rigid, and they cannot possibly meet
all of the variants of the many problems involved. Likewise, administrative regula-
tions are likely to be rigid, bureaucratic, and not too satisfactory. Administrative
"guidelines" issued by government officials are something fairly new on the scene,
but they can be one-sided and can even be dangerous in an essentially scientific area.
Yet in some way law is certain to take a hand.
Doubtless the optimum approach is through carefully drawn and objectively
considered codes or guidelines drafted by the professions for themselves such as those
above sketched. Yet these may be hard to come by, for views diverge and a con-
sensus may be difficult to obtain. The expressions of principle to date have been
characterized by progress but also by generality that is not easily applied in practice.
More efforts of this kind are needed, however, until the gap between published
principles and practical application is eliminated or greatly narrowed. The medical
profession's good record to date is to be noted with favor, but vigilance to avoid
the equivalent of the thalidomide tragedies is called for.
VI
EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF LAW IN MEDICAL PROGRESS
The foregoing discussion should make it apparent that the law is going to play
a large role in the future of at least the four medical areas explored in this article,
and the same is true of other areas in which law and medicine interact. No longer
will the doctor be the free agent responsible only to his conscience, his Hippocratic
oath, and some rather general ethical principles. The law will be a part of his
life. The sources of law are many. Legislatures fill the statute books; courts fill
volumes of case reports; administrators issue reams of regulations. Neither legis-
lators nor judges nor administrators are omniscient, especially in the scientific world
of which medicine is a part. They need all the help they can get.
In the statutory field the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code has made
a significant contribution to improvement in the statute law on abortion; the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws will do the same for homo-
transplantation. These important deliberative bodies are made up of objective, legally
trained persons who work pro bono publico. Perhaps law and medicine could learn
to work effectively together through a prestigious interprofessional group possessing
a similar dedication to the public interest. Certain it is that in the years to come
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the advance of medical science will create a host of new problems of concern to the
law, and lawyers will be constantly seeking to readjust the legal order to meet
changing social needs. The two professions can benefit society as well as themselves
by working harmoniously side by side in seeking the solutions that best accord with
the public interest.
